Organization of Public Safety Networks: Spillovers, Interoperability, and Participation

Production and Operations Management, 26(4), April 2017, 704-723

47 Pages Posted: 22 Sep 2016 Last revised: 21 Apr 2020

See all articles by Yipeng Liu

Yipeng Liu

Northern Illinois University

Hong Guo

University of Notre Dame

Barrie R. Nault

University of Calgary - Haskayne School of Business

Date Written: September 14, 2016

Abstract

We analyze trade-offs in the organization of public safety networks when network assets are distributed across districts and a district values network assets in its own and other districts. Comparing centralized, decentralized, and mixed organization forms, we capture two critical properties: interoperability among distributed technology-based network assets and the ability of districts to opt-in or opt-out of the centralized form. We model the provision of public safety networks, where network assets are chosen by each district or by a federal government, where these assets have a positive cross-district spillover that depends on interoperability, where investments in effort can be made to improve interoperability, and where districts can opt-in or opt-out of centralized provision. With the adoption of centralized, decentralized, or mixed provision as a result of districts’ opt-in or opt-out choices, we identify conditions that determine when the districts deviate from the social optimum and thus regulatory intervention is beneficial to incent the socially optimal organization form. We show how the socially optimal organization form can be achieved through policy instruments such as a sharing rule for the cost of interoperability effort and direct government grants.

Keywords: Centralization, Decentralization, Interoperability, Pubic Safety Networks, First-Net

Suggested Citation

Liu, Yipeng and Guo, Hong and Nault, Barrie R., Organization of Public Safety Networks: Spillovers, Interoperability, and Participation (September 14, 2016). Production and Operations Management, 26(4), April 2017, 704-723, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2841371

Yipeng Liu

Northern Illinois University ( email )

1425 W. Lincoln Hwy
Dekalb, IL 60115-2828
United States

Hong Guo

University of Notre Dame ( email )

356 Mendoza College of Business
Notre Dame, IN 46556-5646
United States

HOME PAGE: http://www.nd.edu/~hguo

Barrie R. Nault (Contact Author)

University of Calgary - Haskayne School of Business ( email )

2500 University Drive, NW
Calgary, Alberta T2N 1N4
Canada

HOME PAGE: http://ucalgary.ca/bnault

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