Boundedly Rational Entrepreneurs and Antitrust

61 Pages Posted: 25 Sep 2016 Last revised: 6 May 2018

See all articles by Avishalom Tor

Avishalom Tor

Notre Dame Law School; University of Haifa - Faculty of Law

Date Written: August 10, 2016

Abstract

This chapter examines entrepreneurial activity and its implication for policy and antitrust law from a behavioral perspective. In particular, the analysis here focuses on the role of two sets of behavioral phenomena — overconfident beliefs and risk- seeking preferences — in facilitating boundedly rational entrepreneurship. Boundedly rational entrepreneurs may engage in entrepreneurial activity, such as the starting of new business ventures, under circumstances in which rational entrepreneurs would decline to do so. Consequently, overconfident or risk-seeking entrants compete with their more rational counterparts and create a postentry landscape that differs markedly from the picture assumed by traditional economic accounts of entrepreneurial activity. The behaviorally informed analysis of entry sheds new light on the dynamics of competition among entrepreneurs and on its implications for policy and antitrust law.

Suggested Citation

Tor, Avishalom, Boundedly Rational Entrepreneurs and Antitrust (August 10, 2016). Antitrust Bulletin, Vol. 62, 2017, 520. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2841515

Avishalom Tor (Contact Author)

Notre Dame Law School ( email )

P.O. Box 780
Notre Dame, IN 46556-0780
United States

University of Haifa - Faculty of Law ( email )

Mount Carmel
Haifa, IN IN 31905
Israel

Register to save articles to
your library

Register

Paper statistics

Downloads
80
rank
292,641
Abstract Views
316
PlumX Metrics