Patent Pools in Input Markets

60 Pages Posted: 26 Sep 2016

See all articles by Markus Reisinger

Markus Reisinger

Frankfurt School of Finance & Management - Economics Department; CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute)

Emanuele Tarantino

University of Mannheim - Department of Economics; Tilburg Law and Economics Center (TILEC)

Date Written: September 2016

Abstract

We show that patent pools formed by owners of perfectly complementary patents are anticompetitive if one of the licensors is integrated with a manufacturer. With vertical integration, the pool serves as coordination device, allowing patent holders to restrict supplies to the product market and share the larger profits of the affiliated manufacturer. These results are robust to entry, the contractual and competitive environments. The imposition of an unbundling and pass-through requirement makes patent pools socially desirable. We also show that this requirement is more effective than a mandated non-discriminatory policy enforcing FRAND commitments in screening anticompetitive pools.

Keywords: Antitrust Policy, Complementary Patents, FRAND, Patent Pools and Joint Marketing Agreements, Vertical Integration and Restraints

JEL Classification: K11, L41, M2

Suggested Citation

Reisinger, Markus and Tarantino, Emanuele, Patent Pools in Input Markets (September 2016). CEPR Discussion Paper No. DP11512, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2843531

Markus Reisinger (Contact Author)

Frankfurt School of Finance & Management - Economics Department ( email )

Adickesallee 32-34
Frankfurt am Main, 60322
Germany

CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute)

Poschinger Str. 5
Munich, DE-81679
Germany

Emanuele Tarantino

University of Mannheim - Department of Economics ( email )

D-68131 Mannheim
Germany

Tilburg Law and Economics Center (TILEC) ( email )

Warandelaan 2
Tilburg, 5000 LE
Netherlands

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