Valence Influence in Electoral Competition with Rank Objectives

40 Pages Posted: 26 Sep 2016

See all articles by Shapoval Alexander

Shapoval Alexander

New Economic School (NES)

Alexei Zakharov

National Research University Higher School of Economics

Shlomo Weber

Southern Methodist University (SMU) - Department of Economics; New Economic School

Date Written: September 2016

Abstract

In this paper we examine the effects of valence in a continuous spatial voting model between two incumbent parties and one potential entrant. All parties are rank-motivated and are driven by their place in the electoral competition. One of our main results is that a sufficiently wide valence gap between the incumbents yields an equilibrium in which no entry will occur. We also show that an increase in valence shifts the high-valence incumbent party closer to the median voter, while the low-valence incumbent selects a more extreme platform.

Keywords: Candidates, Distribution of Ideal Points., Electoral equilibrium, Electoral Game, Rank Objectives, Valence

JEL Classification: C72, D72

Suggested Citation

Alexander, Shapoval and Zakharov, Alexei and Weber, Shlomo, Valence Influence in Electoral Competition with Rank Objectives (September 2016). CEPR Discussion Paper No. DP11527. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2843546

Shapoval Alexander (Contact Author)

New Economic School (NES) ( email )

100A Novaya Street
Moscow, Skolkovo 143026
Russia

Alexei Zakharov

National Research University Higher School of Economics ( email )

Myasnitskaya street, 20
Moscow, Moscow 119017
Russia

Shlomo Weber

Southern Methodist University (SMU) - Department of Economics ( email )

Dallas, TX 75275
United States
214-768-3577 (Phone)
214-768-1821 (Fax)

New Economic School ( email )

Moscow
Russia
+ 7-495-9569508 (Phone)

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