Centralized Admissions and the Student-College Match

64 Pages Posted: 28 Sep 2016 Last revised: 20 Jul 2019

See all articles by Cecilia Machado

Cecilia Machado

Getulio Vargas Foundation (FGV)

Christiane Szerman

Princeton University

Date Written: September 1, 2017

Abstract

Decentralized assignments in the education market have been increasingly replaced by centralized ones. However, empirical evidence on these transitions is scarce. This paper examines the adoption of centralized admissions in the Brazilian higher education market. Using rich administrative data, we exploit time variation in the adoption of a clearinghouse across public institutions to investigate the impacts on student migration and enrollment. We find that institutions under the centralized assignment are able to attract students from other locations, while enrollment rates are unaffected. In addition, we document lower migration rates for students enrolled in institutions that could not switch to centralized admissions, particularly the private ones, indicating that the market becomes more local for them.

Keywords: higher education, centralized matching, college admission, migration, enrollment

JEL Classification: D47, I23, I28

Suggested Citation

Machado, Cecilia and Szerman, Christiane, Centralized Admissions and the Student-College Match (September 1, 2017). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract= or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2844131

Cecilia Machado (Contact Author)

Getulio Vargas Foundation (FGV) ( email )

R. Dr. Neto de Araujo 320 cj 1307
Rio de Janeiro, Rio de Janeiro 22250-900
Brazil

Christiane Szerman

Princeton University ( email )

Department of Economics
Julis Romo Rabinowitz Building
Princeton, NJ 08544
United States

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