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Counterparty Risk and Counterparty Choice in the Credit Default Swap Market

69 Pages Posted: 30 Sep 2016 Last revised: 10 Sep 2017

Wenxin Du

Federal Reserve Board

Salil Gadgil

University of California, Los Angeles (UCLA) - Anderson School of Management

Michael B. Gordy

Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve

Clara Vega

Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System

Multiple version iconThere are 2 versions of this paper

Date Written: August 7, 2017

Abstract

We investigate how market participants price and manage counterparty risk in the post-crisis period using confidential trade repository data on single-name credit default swap (CDS) transactions. We find that counterparty risk has a modest impact on the pricing of CDS contracts, but a large impact on the choice of counterparties. We show that market participants are significantly less likely to trade with counterparties whose credit risk is highly correlated with the credit risk of the reference entities and with counterparties whose credit quality is relatively low. Furthermore, we examine the impact of central clearing on CDS pricing. Contrary to the previous literature, but consistent with our main findings on pricing, we do not find that central clearing increases transaction spreads.

Keywords: Counterparty Credit Risk, Credit Default Swaps, Central Clearing

JEL Classification: G12, G13, G24

Suggested Citation

Du, Wenxin and Gadgil, Salil and Gordy, Michael B. and Vega, Clara, Counterparty Risk and Counterparty Choice in the Credit Default Swap Market (August 7, 2017). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2845567 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2845567

Wenxin Du

Federal Reserve Board ( email )

20th Street and Constitution Avenue NW
Washington, DC 20551
United States

Salil Gadgil

University of California, Los Angeles (UCLA) - Anderson School of Management ( email )

110 Westwood Plaza
Los Angeles, CA 90095-1481
United States

Michael B. Gordy

Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve ( email )

20th & C. St., N.W.
Washington, DC 20551
United States
202-452-3705 (Phone)

Clara Vega (Contact Author)

Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System ( email )

20th Street and Constitution Avenue NW
Washington, DC 20551
United States

HOME PAGE: http://www.federalreserve.gov/research/staff/vegaclarax.htm

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