75 Pages Posted: 1 Oct 2016 Last revised: 21 Oct 2016
Date Written: October 20, 2016
In this paper I rectify the market governance model of Holmstrom and Tirole (1993) to develop and test a number of hypotheses concerning company board structure and incentives. Exogeneity stems from the forced departure of "non-independent" directors with substantial shareholdings from boards due to regulatory-induced pressure. Various market and accounting measures of performance, investment decision-making with respect to acquisitions, and negotiation and monitoring of CEO and non-executive director pay substantially worsen in the presence of this external market monitoring. I conclude that informed traders utilize information about the actions of board members that reinforce market-based incentives.
Keywords: Independent directors, Board monitoring, Governance through Trading, Board performance, Gray directors
JEL Classification: G34, J41, J44, L25
Suggested Citation: Suggested Citation
Swan, Peter L., The Complementary Roles of Board Incentives and Market Monitoring: Theory and Evidence (October 20, 2016). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2845926 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2845926