Quacks or Bootleggers: Who's Really Regulating Hedge Funds?

78 Pages Posted: 2 Oct 2016 Last revised: 12 Aug 2020

See all articles by Jeremy Kidd

Jeremy Kidd

Drake University - Law School

Date Written: February 7, 2017

Abstract

Influential scholars of corporate law have questioned previous federal interventions into corporate governance, calling it quackery. Invoking images of medical malpractice, these critiques have argued persuasively that Congress, in responding to crises, make policy that disrupts efficient private rules and established state laws. This article applies the Bootleggers and Baptists theory to show that Dodd-Frank’s hedge-fund rules are more than just negligent or reckless, but designed to benefit special interests that compete with the hedge fund model. Those rules offer no solutions to any real or perceived risks arising from hedge-fund investing, but might offer an advantage to competitors of hedge funds.

Keywords: Hedge Funds, corporate law, public choice, securities regulation

JEL Classification: D72, G38, K22, P16

Suggested Citation

Kidd, Jeremy, Quacks or Bootleggers: Who's Really Regulating Hedge Funds? (February 7, 2017). Washington and Lee Law Review, Vol. 75, 2018, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2846243 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2846243

Jeremy Kidd (Contact Author)

Drake University - Law School ( email )

27th & Carpenter Sts.
Des Moines, IA 50311
United States

Do you have a job opening that you would like to promote on SSRN?

Paper statistics

Downloads
155
Abstract Views
1,683
Rank
379,907
PlumX Metrics