The Value of Scattered Information

47 Pages Posted: 4 Oct 2016 Last revised: 6 Oct 2022

See all articles by Christian L. Goulding

Christian L. Goulding

Auburn University - Harbert College of Business

Xingtan Zhang

University of Colorado at Boulder - Department of Finance

Date Written: October 5, 2022

Abstract

We analyze a model in which the value of a security is comprised of multiple distinct parts and private information about these pieces is scattered among investors. We show that as information is scattered into smaller, distinctively informative pieces, endogenous information acquisition activity can increase, even if the acquisition cost does not decrease. As a result, an information monopolist has an incentive to sell scattered information. Our model generates new insights and testable predictions about financial information markets, segmentation of firm-specific information, and informed trading.

Keywords: Asymmetric Information, Multiple Dimensions of Uncertainty, Information Acquisition, Information Monopolist

JEL Classification: D82, G14

Suggested Citation

Goulding, Christian L. and Zhang, Xingtan, The Value of Scattered Information (October 5, 2022). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2846482 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2846482

Christian L. Goulding (Contact Author)

Auburn University - Harbert College of Business ( email )

Auburn, AL 36849
United States

Xingtan Zhang

University of Colorado at Boulder - Department of Finance ( email )

Campus Box 419
Boulder, CO 80309
United States

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