ESBies: Safety in the Tranches

55 Pages Posted: 3 Oct 2016

See all articles by Markus K. Brunnermeier

Markus K. Brunnermeier

Princeton University - Department of Economics

Sam Langfield

European Central Bank

Marco Pagano

CSEF - University of Naples Federico II - Centre for Studies in Economics and Finance (CSEF); Einaudi Institute for Economics and Finance (EIEF); Research Institute of Industrial Economics (IFN); Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR); European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI)

Ricardo Reis

London School of Economics & Political Science (LSE); National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER); Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

Stijn Van Nieuwerburgh

Columbia University Graduate School of Business; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER); Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR); ABFER

Dimitri Vayanos

London School of Economics; Center for Economic Policy Research (CEPR); National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

Multiple version iconThere are 3 versions of this paper

Date Written: September 2016

Abstract

The euro crisis was fueled by the diabolic loop between sovereign risk and bank risk, coupled with cross-border flight-to-safety capital flows. European Safe Bonds (ESBies), a union-wide safe asset without joint liability, would help to resolve these problems. We make three contributions. First, numerical simulations show that ESBies would be at least as safe as German bunds and approximately double the supply of euro safe assets when protected by a 30%-thick junior tranche. Second, a model shows how, when and why the two features of ESBies - diversification and seniority - can weaken the diabolic loop and its diffusion across countries. Third, we propose a step-by-step guide on how to create ESBies, starting with limited issuance by public or private-sector entities.

Keywords: bank-sovereign loop, ESBies, Euro crisis, monetary policy, public debt issuance, safe assets

JEL Classification: E5, F3, G1, G2, H6

Suggested Citation

Brunnermeier, Markus Konrad and Langfield, Sam and Pagano, Marco and Reis, Ricardo A.M.R. and Van Nieuwerburgh, Stijn and Vayanos, Dimitri, ESBies: Safety in the Tranches (September 2016). CEPR Discussion Paper No. DP11537, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2847071

Markus Konrad Brunnermeier (Contact Author)

Princeton University - Department of Economics ( email )

Bendheim Center for Finance
Princeton, NJ
United States
609-258-4050 (Phone)
609-258-0771 (Fax)

HOME PAGE: http://www.princeton.edu/¡­markus

Sam Langfield

European Central Bank ( email )

Sonnemannstrasse 22
Frankfurt am Main, 60314
Germany

Marco Pagano

CSEF - University of Naples Federico II - Centre for Studies in Economics and Finance (CSEF) ( email )

Via Cintia
Complesso Monte S. Angelo
Naples, Naples 80126
Italy

Einaudi Institute for Economics and Finance (EIEF)

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Rome, 00187
Italy

Research Institute of Industrial Economics (IFN)

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Stockholm, SE-102 15
Sweden

Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

London
United Kingdom

European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI)

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1000 Brussels
Belgium

HOME PAGE: http:/www.ecgi.org

Ricardo A.M.R. Reis

London School of Economics & Political Science (LSE) ( email )

Houghton Street
London, WC2A 2AE
United Kingdom

National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

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Cambridge, MA 02138
United States

Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

London
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Stijn Van Nieuwerburgh

Columbia University Graduate School of Business ( email )

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United States

HOME PAGE: http://https://www0.gsb.columbia.edu/faculty/svannieuwerburgh/

National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

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Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

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ABFER ( email )

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Singapore

Dimitri Vayanos

London School of Economics ( email )

A350
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United Kingdom
+44 (0)20 7955 6382 (Phone)
+44 (0)20 7955 7420 (Fax)

Center for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

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United States

National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

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