Supply Disruption with a Risk-Averse Buyer

46 Pages Posted: 5 Oct 2016

See all articles by Daniel Adelman

Daniel Adelman

The University of Chicago Booth School of Business

Shanshan Wang

Boston Consulting Group - Hong Kong

Date Written: September 10, 2013


We consider a supply chain with two unreliable suppliers competing to supply one risk-averse buyer. We model the interaction among the supply chain participants as a Nash game among the suppliers, and Stackelberg games between the suppliers and the buyer. By introducing risk aversion, the buyer implements a spectrum of distinctive diversification and order inflation strategies, instead of the extreme ordering strategies of single sourcing, duplicate sourcing and various boundary ordering strategies in the risk-neutral case. In the case of exogenous wholesale price, we fully characterize the buyer's optimal order quantities. We find that the more reliable supplier can possibly increase his market share by increasing his wholesale price. In the case of endogenous wholesale prices, we find that cases of non-existence, uniqueness and multiplicity of equilibria can all possibly occur depending on the level of risk aversion, and we characterize the equilibrium in some cases. We also find that as the buyer becomes more risk averse he is less sensitive to the wholesale prices in terms of order quantities, giving more power to the suppliers to exploit the buyer's risk.

Keywords: supply disruptions, supply diversification, competition, equilibrium pricing, risk aversion

Suggested Citation

Adelman, Daniel and Wang, Shanshan, Supply Disruption with a Risk-Averse Buyer (September 10, 2013). Chicago Booth Research Paper No. 16-20, Available at SSRN: or

Daniel Adelman (Contact Author)

The University of Chicago Booth School of Business ( email )

5807 S. Woodlawn Avenue
Chicago, IL 60637
United States
773-834-2019 (Phone)

Shanshan Wang

Boston Consulting Group - Hong Kong

34th Floor, Tower Two
Times Square, Causeway Bay
Hong Kong
Hong Kong

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