Marquis De Condorcet and the Two-Dimensional Jury Model
Forthcoming in “Alain Marciano and Giovanni Ramello (eds.): Law and Economics in Europe and the U.S.: The Legacy of Jürgen Backhaus, Springer”
19 Pages Posted: 10 Oct 2016
Date Written: October 4, 2016
The two-dimensional jury model, which is the core of this paper, demonstrates the two, partly conflicting, dimensions in Condorcet’s work and life. There is the dimension of enlightenment, reflected in Condorcet’s jury theorem, i.e., the belief that there is some truth can be approximated in collective decision making. On the other hand, there is creed that individual preferences are the building block of the society with the consequence of inevitable conflicts in aggregating them. This paper combines the idea of winning a maximum of votes in a voting game with utility maximization that derives from the winning proposition. The model assumes a first mover, the plaintiff, and a second-mover, the counsel of the defendant. Typically, these agents represent parties that have conflicting interests. Here they face an arbitration court in the form of jury that consists of three voters such that no single voter has a majority of votes. The agents are interested in both gaining the support of a majority of jury members and seeing their preferred alternative selected as outcome. It will be demonstrated that equilibrium decision making can be derived for this model.
Keywords: Condorcet’s jury theorem, Voting Paradox, majority cycle, aggregation of preferences, agenda setting, arbitration, arbitration court, collective decision making
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