Gender Differences in Executives’ Access to Information

Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, 52.3, 991-1016, June 2017

Posted: 5 Oct 2016 Last revised: 19 Aug 2017

See all articles by A. Can Inci

A. Can Inci

Bryant University

M. P. Narayanan

University of Michigan, Stephen M. Ross School of Business

H. Nejat Seyhun

University of Michigan, Stephen M. Ross School of Business

Date Written: June 1, 2017

Abstract

We provide novel evidence on gender differences in insider-trading behavior and the profitability of senior corporate executives. On average, both female and male executives make positive profits from insider trading. Males, however, earn significantly more than females in equivalent positions and also trade more than females. These gender differences disappear when we limit the sample to firms in which female trading is relatively high. Collectively, these results suggest that female executives have a disadvantage relative to males in access to inside information, even if they have equal formal status, and informal networks may play an important role in attenuating this disadvantage.

Keywords: Gender, Overconfidence, Insider Trading, Information Access

JEL Classification: G02, G14, G30, J16

Suggested Citation

Inci, Ahmet Can and Narayanan, M. P. and Seyhun, H. Nejat, Gender Differences in Executives’ Access to Information (June 1, 2017). Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, 52.3, 991-1016, June 2017. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2847906

Ahmet Can Inci (Contact Author)

Bryant University ( email )

1150 Douglas Pike
Smithfield, RI 02917
United States

M. P. Narayanan

University of Michigan, Stephen M. Ross School of Business ( email )

701 Tappan Street
Ann Arbor, MI MI 48109
United States
734-763-5936 (Phone)
734-936-0274 (Fax)

H. Nejat Seyhun

University of Michigan, Stephen M. Ross School of Business ( email )

701 Tappan Street
Ann Arbor, MI MI 48109
United States
734-763-5463 (Phone)

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