The Value of a Coalition is Power

Homo Oeconomicus, Vol. 15, p. 485-501, 1999

15 Pages Posted: 5 Oct 2016

See all articles by Manfred J. Holler

Manfred J. Holler

University of Hamburg - Faculty of Economics and Business Administration

Mika Widgren

Yrjö Jahnsson Foundation

Date Written: October 4, 1999

Abstract

The message of this paper is that value of a coalition is power. This coincides with the view that coalitions do not have preferences, but merely represent the preferences of their members. Implications are discussed with the respect to (a) the hypothesis that power indices cannot explain decision-making in the European Union because they do not take into consideration the preferences of the member countries and (b) the fitness concept of evolutionary game theory and the identity of fitness and power. After a presentation of selected power indices, the question is discussed as to whether these measures express expectations or whether they conceptualize power. A corresponding re-interpretation of the (non-)monotonicity of power measures concludes the paper.

Keywords: Power Indices, Power, Coalition Formation, European Union, Public Good Index

Suggested Citation

Holler, Manfred J. and Widgren, Mika, The Value of a Coalition is Power (October 4, 1999). Homo Oeconomicus, Vol. 15, p. 485-501, 1999, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2847908

Manfred J. Holler (Contact Author)

University of Hamburg - Faculty of Economics and Business Administration ( email )

Von-Melle-Park 5
Hamburg, 20146
Germany

Mika Widgren

Yrjö Jahnsson Foundation

Ludviginkatu 3-5A
00130 Helsinki
United States

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