The Value of a Coalition is Power
Homo Oeconomicus, Vol. 15, p. 485-501, 1999
15 Pages Posted: 5 Oct 2016
Date Written: October 4, 1999
The message of this paper is that value of a coalition is power. This coincides with the view that coalitions do not have preferences, but merely represent the preferences of their members. Implications are discussed with the respect to (a) the hypothesis that power indices cannot explain decision-making in the European Union because they do not take into consideration the preferences of the member countries and (b) the fitness concept of evolutionary game theory and the identity of fitness and power. After a presentation of selected power indices, the question is discussed as to whether these measures express expectations or whether they conceptualize power. A corresponding re-interpretation of the (non-)monotonicity of power measures concludes the paper.
Keywords: Power Indices, Power, Coalition Formation, European Union, Public Good Index
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