Preferential Resource Spending Under an Employment Guarantee: The Political Economy of Mgnregs in Andhra Pradesh

79 Pages Posted: 7 Oct 2016

See all articles by Megan Sheahan

Megan Sheahan

Cornell University - Dyson School of Applied Economics and Management

Yanyan Liu

International Food Policy Research Institute (IFPRI)

Christopher B. Barrett

Cornell University - Charles H. Dyson School of Applied Economics & Management

Sudha Narayanan

Indira Gandhi Institute of Development Research (IGIDR)

Date Written: September 12, 2016

Abstract

Are ostensibly demand-driven public works programs with high levels of safeguards nonetheless susceptible to political influence? This conjecture is investigated using expenditure data at the local level from India's National Rural Employment Guarantee Scheme. Focusing on one state where accountability and transparency mechanisms have been employed and implementation efforts have been widely applauded, there is no evidence of partisan-influenced spending before the 2009 election however a statistically significant but small in magnitude effect after the 2009 election. Most variation in public works expenditures is explained by the observed needs of potential beneficiaries, as the scheme intended.

Keywords: Governance Diagnostic Capacity Building

Suggested Citation

Sheahan, Megan and Liu, Yanyan and Barrett, Christopher B. and Narayanan, Sudha, Preferential Resource Spending Under an Employment Guarantee: The Political Economy of Mgnregs in Andhra Pradesh (September 12, 2016). World Bank Policy Research Working Paper No. 7818. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2849118

Megan Sheahan (Contact Author)

Cornell University - Dyson School of Applied Economics and Management ( email )

Ithaca, NY
United States

Yanyan Liu

International Food Policy Research Institute (IFPRI) ( email )

1201 Eye St, NW,
Washington, DC 20005
United States

Christopher B. Barrett

Cornell University - Charles H. Dyson School of Applied Economics & Management ( email )

315 Warren Hall
Ithaca, NY 14853-7801
United States
607-255-4489 (Phone)
607-255-9984 (Fax)

HOME PAGE: http://aem.cornell.edu/faculty_sites/cbb2/

Sudha Narayanan

Indira Gandhi Institute of Development Research (IGIDR) ( email )

Gen A.K. Vaidya Marg Santoshnagar
Goregaon (East)
Mumbai, Maharashtra 400065
India

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