The Problems with Moral Subjectivism
Think 46, Vol. 16 (Summer 2017), pp. 25-36
Singapore Management University School of Law Research Paper No. 20/2016
10 Pages Posted: 20 Oct 2016 Last revised: 8 Apr 2017
Date Written: 2016
Abstract
Moral dialogue for moral subjectivists is gravely limited. As soon as moral subjectivists hold another person to any moral standard independent of the person’s belief, they must give up their moral subjectivism. Some moral subjectivists might turn out to be moral realists who accord primacy to autonomy. This, however, is a senseless position that renders all persons equally worthless, unless such moral realists concede that norms that limit autonomy exist. But if so, they are not different from any other moral realists after all.
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