College Admissions with Complementarities

23 Pages Posted: 11 Oct 2016 Last revised: 3 Apr 2017

See all articles by Azar Abizada

Azar Abizada

Azerbaijan Diplomatic Academy

Umut Dur

North Carolina State University

Date Written: April 2, 2017

Abstract

We study many-to-one matching with complementarities. Real life examples include college admissions with two-sided monetary transfers, teacher assignment with different teaching loads, worker assignment. Due to the presence of complementarities, the conditions that are essential for the existence of stable allocation fail. Despite this failure, we provide conditions to guarantee the existence of stable allocation. To our knowledge this is the first paper obtaining positive result related to existence of (group) stable matching and existence of strategy-proof and (group) stable mechanism in the presence of complementarities.

Keywords: pairwise stability, group stability, Max-Min criterion, budget constraints

JEL Classification: C78, D47

Suggested Citation

Abizada, Azar and Dur, Umut, College Admissions with Complementarities (April 2, 2017). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2850446 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2850446

Azar Abizada (Contact Author)

Azerbaijan Diplomatic Academy ( email )

11 Ahmadbey Aghaoglu Street
Baku, AZ1008
Azerbaijan

Umut Dur

North Carolina State University ( email )

Hillsborough Street
Raleigh, NC 27695
United States

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