Pre-Commercial Procurement, Procurement of Innovative Solutions and Innovation Partnerships in the EU: Rationale and Strategy

IEFE - Centre for Research on Energy and Environmental Economics and Policy, Working Paper No. 89, October, 2016

40 Pages Posted: 12 Oct 2016 Last revised: 9 Nov 2017

See all articles by Elisabetta Iossa

Elisabetta Iossa

University of Rome Tor Vergata; IEFE Bocconi University; Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

Federico Biagi

European Union - IPTS

Paola Valbonesi

University of Padova

Date Written: October 28, 2017

Abstract

Abstract: We discuss public procurement instruments for acquiring innovation, focusing on the European Pre-commercial Procurement, Procurement of Innovative Solutions and Innovation Partnerships. We analyse in particular how firms’ innovation incentives are affected by: (i) economies of scope and externalities between R&D and large-scale production; (ii) the degree of specificity of the innovation; (iii) the presence of Small and Medium Enterprises (SMEs) in the market and the level of market competition; (iv) the risk of market foreclosure and supplier lock-in. Our study contributes to the literature on incentives in demand-side innovation policy by tapping into the contractual design features and by offering relevant implications for academics and policy makers. (107 words)

Keywords: Keywords: Innovation, Demand-side policies, Incentives, Pre-commercial Procurement, Public Procurement of Innovative Solutions, Innovation Partnership, Bundling, Rationales

JEL Classification: JEL Code: O31; O32; O38; H57

Suggested Citation

Iossa, Elisabetta and Biagi, Federico and Valbonesi, Paola, Pre-Commercial Procurement, Procurement of Innovative Solutions and Innovation Partnerships in the EU: Rationale and Strategy (October 28, 2017). IEFE - Centre for Research on Energy and Environmental Economics and Policy, Working Paper No. 89, October, 2016, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2850892 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2850892

Elisabetta Iossa (Contact Author)

University of Rome Tor Vergata ( email )

Via Columbia n.2
Rome, 00133
Italy

IEFE Bocconi University ( email )

Via Roentgen 1
Milan, Milan 20136
Italy

Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR) ( email )

London
United Kingdom

Federico Biagi

European Union - IPTS ( email )

calle inca garcilaso, 3
Seville, 41092
Spain

Paola Valbonesi

University of Padova ( email )

Via 8 Febbraio 1848, 2
Padova, Vicenza 35122
Italy

Here is the Coronavirus
related research on SSRN

Paper statistics

Downloads
120
Abstract Views
464
rank
262,696
PlumX Metrics