Bureaucratic Capacity and Preference Attainment in International Economic Negotiations. Negotiating BITs with Models

40 Pages Posted: 14 Oct 2016 Last revised: 4 May 2021

See all articles by Tarald Laudal Berge

Tarald Laudal Berge

University of Oslo, Faculty of Social Sciences, Department of Political Science

Øyvind Stiansen

Pluricourts; University of Oslo

Date Written: October 12, 2016

Abstract

What determines states' ability to influence the contents of international agreements to which they become party? The existing empirical literature on international economic negotiations use models of strategic competition to explain negotiated outcomes, persistently highlighting the importance of political, economic, and military sources of power. We argue that states' bureaucratic capacity is an underestimated source of negotiating power, and develop a theory of two modes through which states' bureaucratic capacity can influence negotiated outcomes in bilateral investment treaty negotiations. We then test our theory on a sample of 810 investment treaty negotiations. To measure preference attainment, we compare a unique repository of model investment treaties with finalized investment treaty texts. Our analysis indicates that having higher bureaucratic capacity than one's negotiating counterpart is associated with higher preference attainment in investment negotiations. Our findings have important implications for state policy-makers engaged in investment policy reform and treaty (re)negotiations.

Keywords: international investment law, bilateral investment treaties, negotiations, preferences, power, expertise

Suggested Citation

Berge, Tarald Laudal and Stiansen, Øyvind, Bureaucratic Capacity and Preference Attainment in International Economic Negotiations. Negotiating BITs with Models (October 12, 2016). PluriCourts Research Paper, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2851454 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2851454

Tarald Laudal Berge (Contact Author)

University of Oslo, Faculty of Social Sciences, Department of Political Science ( email )

Moltke Moesvei 31
Oslo
Norway

Øyvind Stiansen

Pluricourts ( email )

P.O. Box 6706
St. Olavs plass 5
0130 Oslo
Norway

University of Oslo ( email )

PO Box 6706 St Olavs plass
Oslo, N-0317
Norway

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