Factions in Nondemocracies: Theory and Evidence from the Chinese Communist Party

60 Pages Posted: 14 Oct 2016 Last revised: 26 Aug 2020

See all articles by Patrick Francois

Patrick Francois

University of British Columbia (UBC) - Department of Economics

Francesco Trebbi

University of California, Berkeley - Haas School of Business; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

Kairong Xiao

Columbia University - Columbia Business School

Multiple version iconThere are 3 versions of this paper

Date Written: October 1, 2016

Abstract

This paper investigates, theoretically and empirically, factional arrangements within the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), the governing political party of the People's Republic of China. Using detailed biographical information of political elites in the Central Committee and provincial governments, we present a set of new empirical regularities within the CCP, including systematic patterns of cross-factional balancing at different levels of the political hierarchy and substantial faction premia in promotions. We propose and estimate an organizational economic model to characterize factional politics within single-party nondemocratic regimes.

Keywords: Political Factions, The Chinese Communist Party

JEL Classification: P3, P48

Suggested Citation

Francois, Patrick and Trebbi, Francesco and Xiao, Kairong, Factions in Nondemocracies: Theory and Evidence from the Chinese Communist Party (October 1, 2016). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2852121 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2852121

Patrick Francois

University of British Columbia (UBC) - Department of Economics ( email )

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Francesco Trebbi (Contact Author)

University of California, Berkeley - Haas School of Business ( email )

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National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) ( email )

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Kairong Xiao

Columbia University - Columbia Business School ( email )

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