21 Pages Posted: 26 Sep 2001 Last revised: 18 May 2009
Date Written: 2001
In a recent article, we have put forward a new approach to takeover law and regulatory competition. We proposed a "choice-enhancing" federal intervention that would provide: (i) an optional body of substantive federal takeover law which shareholders would be able to opt into (or out of) and which would be more hospitable than existing state takeover law, and (ii) a mandatory process rule that would provide shareholders the right to initiate and adopt, regardless of managers' wishes, proposals for option into (or out of) the federal takeover law. In this paper, we respond to a critique of our proposal by Professors Stephen Choi and Andrew Guzman, and we further develop the case for choice-enhancing intervention.
JEL Classification: G30, H70, K22
Suggested Citation: Suggested Citation
Bebchuk, Lucian A. and Ferrell, Allen, Federal Intervention to Enhance Shareholder Choice (2001). Virginia Law Review, Vol. 87, pp. 993-1006, 2001; Harvard Law and Economics Discussion Paper No. 332. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=285252 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.285252