The Industrial Organization of Corruption: Monopoly, Competition and Collusion
44 Pages Posted: 18 May 2017
Date Written: February 10, 2017
We experimentally investigate how the introduction of competition between public officials for the provision of a given license affects extortionary corruption, i.e., the demands of harassment bribes. We examine transactions that are likely to be one-shot, such as the delivery of a driver's license, and transactions that require frequent interactions between the parties and therefore allow for reputation building, such as yearly renewals of building permits. Finally, we examine officials' ability to collude by communicating before setting their bribe demands. We find that introducing competition significantly reduces corruption both in settings characterized by one-shot and by repeated interactions between citizens and officials. While the possibility of collusion lowers the effectiveness of competition, officials are unable to sustain collusion in the long run.
Keywords: Extortionary Corruption, Monopoly, Competition, Collusion, Experiment
JEL Classification: D73, D49, C92
Suggested Citation: Suggested Citation