The Article Iii Jury

113 Pages Posted: 26 Sep 2001

See all articles by Ann Woolhandler

Ann Woolhandler

affiliation not provided to SSRN

Michael G. Collins

University of Virginia School of Law

Abstract

Current dissatisfaction with the civil jury is often coupled with fatalism as to the judicial system's ability to do anything about it. Yet the whimsical nature of jury verdicts is to a large extent a wound that the judiciary has inflicted upon itself and litigants. Viewing the jury in terms of traditional federal courts scholarship-as an alternative decisionmaker to the Article III judge-shows both the long and consistent history of extensive judicial involvement in jury decisionmaking from the early Republic up through the Lochner era, and the later movement of the New Deal Court effectively to abandon it.

Contrary to the belief of scholars and jurists, the Seventh Amendment should not present an obstacle to enhanced judicial control of juries, such as those in which the Court once engaged. While the Amendment will obviously present limitations on certain kinds of reform, the greater obstacle may prove to be a judicial unwillingness to engage in the difficult task of immersion into and elaboration of the facts and law of quotidian cases. To be sure, deference to other decisional institutions may enhance legitimacy, as when the courts defer to legislative judgments as to the rationality of economic legislation. But excessive deference to juries may undermine legitimacy by delegating the primary judicial responsibility of assuring the quality of justice.

Suggested Citation

Woolhandler, Ann and Collins, Michael G., The Article Iii Jury. Virginia Law Review, Vol. 87, pp. 587-699, June 2001. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=285274

Ann Woolhandler (Contact Author)

affiliation not provided to SSRN

Michael G. Collins

University of Virginia School of Law ( email )

580 Massie Road
Charlottesville, VA 22903
United States
434-243-2385 (Phone)

Register to save articles to
your library

Register

Paper statistics

Downloads
89
rank
276,230
Abstract Views
1,332
PlumX Metrics