Download This PaperConvergence of Price Processes Under Two Dynamic Double Auctions
Journal of Mechanism and Institution Design, (Forthcoming)
34 Pages Posted: 19 Oct 2016
Date Written: October 17, 2016
Abstract
We study the convergence of two price processes generated by two dynamic double auctions (DA) and provide conditions under which the two price processes converge to a Walrasian equilibrium of the underlying economy. When the conditions are not satisfied, the price processes may converge to prices that form a bubble or a crash.
Keywords: double auction mechanisms, incremental subgradient methods, job matching market, network resource allocations
JEL Classification: D44, D50
Suggested Citation: Suggested Citation
Ma, Jinpeng and Li, Qiongling, Convergence of Price Processes Under Two Dynamic Double Auctions (October 17, 2016). Journal of Mechanism and Institution Design, (Forthcoming), Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2853950
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