Post‐Cameralist Governance: Towards a Robust Political Economy of Bureaucracy

15 Pages Posted: 25 Oct 2016

See all articles by Alexander William Salter

Alexander William Salter

Texas Tech University - Rawls College of Business; American Institute for Economic Research

Multiple version iconThere are 2 versions of this paper

Date Written: October 2016

Abstract

I develop a robust political economy of bureaucracy by highlighting the conditions necessary for hierarchical administrative bodies to govern protectively and productively, but not predatorily. These conditions are residual claimancy and jurisdictional competition. I make this argument by exploring a post‐cameralist interpretation of governance. Cameralism arose as a governance philosophy in the fractured principalities of seventeenth‐century Germany following the Thirty Years' War. Post‐cameralism focuses not on particular cameralist governance strategies but on a paradigm which sees governance as an activity provided within a larger exchange order, rather than imposing itself on that order as in more conventional treatments of public economics. While a post‐cameralist conception of governance comes with its own challenges, such as tensions with normative visions that promote self‐governance, it nonetheless presents an intriguing synthesis of monocentric and polycentric insights.

Keywords: bureaucracy, cameralism, jurisdictional competition, polycentricity, post‐cameralism, residual claimancy, robust political economy

Suggested Citation

Salter, Alexander William, Post‐Cameralist Governance: Towards a Robust Political Economy of Bureaucracy (October 2016). Economic Affairs, Vol. 36, Issue 3, pp. 294-308, 2016. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2857345 or http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/ecaf.12195

Alexander William Salter (Contact Author)

Texas Tech University - Rawls College of Business ( email )

Lubbock, TX 79409
United States

HOME PAGE: http://awsalter.com

American Institute for Economic Research

PO Box 1000
Great Barrington, MA 01230
United States

Register to save articles to
your library

Register

Paper statistics

Downloads
0
Abstract Views
92
PlumX Metrics