Abstract

https://ssrn.com/abstract=2857607
 


 



Policy Reform and the Problem of Private Investment: Evidence from the Power Sector


Johannes Urpelainen


Columbia University

Joonseok Yang


Columbia University

August 5, 2016

Journal of Policy Analysis and Management, Forthcoming

Abstract:     
Development economists frequently emphasize the importance of good infrastructure for economic growth. Can governments attract private capital in infrastructural investments through policy reform? We address this question by showing that, in the case of electricity generation, a simple legislation enabling independent power production increases private investment in electricity generation by more than an order of magnitude. Contrary to the conventional wisdom on the importance of constraints on executive power for credible commitment, we find that such constraints neither draw private capital nor condition the effectiveness of policy reform. We also find that both domestic and foreign investment increase with IPP reform. Evidence for these claims comes from an instrumental variable analysis of power sector reforms and private electricity generation in all developing countries for the years 1982-2008. Simple and politically uncontroversial policies can generate positive results in developing countries.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 133

Keywords: international political economy, power sector reform, infrastructure investment, veto players, executive constraints, policy reform


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Date posted: October 24, 2016  

Suggested Citation

Urpelainen, Johannes and Yang, Joonseok, Policy Reform and the Problem of Private Investment: Evidence from the Power Sector (August 5, 2016). Journal of Policy Analysis and Management, Forthcoming. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2857607

Contact Information

Johannes Urpelainen (Contact Author)
Columbia University ( email )
3022 Broadway
New York, NY 10027
United States
HOME PAGE: http://www.columbia.edu/~ju2178
Joonseok Yang
Columbia University ( email )
3022 Broadway
New York, NY 10027
United States
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