Achieving Price Stability by Manipulating the Central Bank's Payment on Reserves

41 Pages Posted: 24 Oct 2016

See all articles by Robert E. Hall

Robert E. Hall

Hoover Institution and Department of Economics, Stanford University; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

Ricardo Reis

London School of Economics & Political Science (LSE); National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER); Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

Multiple version iconThere are 2 versions of this paper

Date Written: October 2016

Abstract

Today, all major central banks pay or collect interest on reserves, and stand ready to use the interest rate as an instrument of monetary policy. We show that by paying an appropriate rate on reserves, the central bank can pin the price level uniquely to a target. The essential idea is to index reserves to the market interest rate, the price level, and the target price level in a way that creates a contractionary financial force if the price level is above the target and an expansionary force if below. Our payment-on-reserves policy process does not require terminal conditions like Taylor rules, exogenous fiscal surpluses like the fiscal theory of the price level, liquidity preference as in quantity theories, or local approximations as in new Keynesian models. The process accommodates liquidity services from reserves, segmented financial markets where only some institutions can hold reserves, and nominal rigidities. We believe it would be easy to implement.

JEL Classification: E31, E42, E58

Suggested Citation

Hall, Robert E. and Reis, Ricardo A.M.R., Achieving Price Stability by Manipulating the Central Bank's Payment on Reserves (October 2016). CEPR Discussion Paper No. DP11578. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2858241

Robert E. Hall (Contact Author)

Hoover Institution and Department of Economics, Stanford University ( email )

Stanford, CA 94305-6010
United States
650-723-2215 (Phone)

National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

1050 Massachusetts Avenue
Cambridge, MA 02138
United States
650-723-2215 (Phone)

Ricardo A.M.R. Reis

London School of Economics & Political Science (LSE) ( email )

Houghton Street
London, WC2A 2AE
United Kingdom

National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

1050 Massachusetts Avenue
Cambridge, MA 02138
United States

Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

London
United Kingdom

Register to save articles to
your library

Register

Paper statistics

Downloads
0
Abstract Views
126
PlumX Metrics