State Helps Those Who Help Themselves: State Aid and Burden-Sharing

13 Pages Posted: 26 Oct 2016 Last revised: 5 Dec 2016

See all articles by Valia Babis

Valia Babis

Bank of England; University of Cambridge - Faculty of Law

Date Written: December 1, 2016

Abstract

Since the beginning of the financial crisis, various forms of public support have been employed to provide financial assistance to troubled banks. Any such operation involving public funds must comply with EU State aid rules in order to prevent competitive distortions between banks and member states. This paper begins by examining the interaction between State aid and the Bank Recovery and Resolution Directive (BRRD) and demonstrates the continuing importance of State aid approval both in and outside resolution. The paper continues by focusing on burden-sharing as a requirement for State aid approval and examines the Commission’s approach to burden-sharing in State aid cases to date. Against this background, the paper continues by considering the CJEU’s judgment in Kotnik and Others (Case C-526/14). The paper comments on the CJEU’s findings and assesses the potential future impact of the judgment. The main conclusions are that legal certainty provided by the CJEU is to be welcomed, that the judgment is unlikely to affect the Commission’s established approach, and that the judgment could have an impact on future cases on public support to the banking sector.

Keywords: State Aid; BRRD; Kotnik; Burden Sharing; Bail-In; Commission

JEL Classification: K2; K20; G28

Suggested Citation

Babis, Valia, State Helps Those Who Help Themselves: State Aid and Burden-Sharing (December 1, 2016). University of Cambridge Faculty of Law Research Paper No. 62/2016, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2858360 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2858360

Valia Babis (Contact Author)

Bank of England ( email )

Threadneedle Street
London, EC2R 8AH
United Kingdom

University of Cambridge - Faculty of Law ( email )

10 West Road
Cambridge, CB3 9DZ
United Kingdom

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