Effort Application in an Arranged Marriage: A Game-Theoretic Analysis

RIT Economics Department Working Paper No. 16-13

13 Pages Posted: 26 Oct 2016

See all articles by Amitrajeet A. Batabyal

Amitrajeet A. Batabyal

Rochester Institute of Technology (RIT) - Department of Economics

Seung Jick Yoo

Korea Energy Economics Institute

Multiple version iconThere are 2 versions of this paper

Date Written: October 24, 2016

Abstract

In this note we study a simple game model of effort application by two individuals (1 and 2) who wish to have an arranged marriage. We first specify the net utility function of individual i as a function of this individual’s own effort and the effort applied by individual j,ij, in three distinct cases. Next, we compute the ith individual’s best response function. Finally, we analyze effort application by two identical pairs of individuals who are located in two different nations. In the first (second) nation, arranged marriages are uncommon (common) and hence it is relatively difficult (straightforward) for the two individuals to apply and coordinate effort. We explain why the net utility of the pair wishing to have an arranged marriage in the first nation is likely to be much lower than the corresponding net utility of the pair in the second nation.

Keywords: Arranged Marriage, Effort, Net Utility, Static Game, Strategic Complements

JEL Classification: J12, D13

Suggested Citation

Batabyal, Amitrajeet A. and Yoo, Seung Jick, Effort Application in an Arranged Marriage: A Game-Theoretic Analysis (October 24, 2016). RIT Economics Department Working Paper No. 16-13. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2858529 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2858529

Amitrajeet A. Batabyal (Contact Author)

Rochester Institute of Technology (RIT) - Department of Economics ( email )

92 Lomb Memorial Drive
Rochester, NY 14623-5604
United States
585-475-2805 (Phone)
585-475-5777 (Fax)

HOME PAGE: http://people.rit.edu/aabgsh

Seung Jick Yoo

Korea Energy Economics Institute ( email )

665-1 Naeson2-dong
Euiwang-si
Kyunggi-Do 437-082
Korea

HOME PAGE: http://www.rit.edu/~aabgsh/

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