Using Employer Hiring Behavior to Test the Educational Signalling Hypothesis
21 Pages Posted: 22 Oct 2001
Date Written: September 2001
Abstract
This Paper presents a test of the educational signalling hypothesis. If employers use education as a signal in the hiring process, they will rely more on education when less is otherwise known about applicants. We find that employers are more likely to lower educational standards when an informal, more informative recruitment channel is used, so we conclude that education is used as a signal in the hiring process.
Keywords: Recruitment, signalling
JEL Classification: I20
Suggested Citation: Suggested Citation
CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute)
Poschinger Str. 5
Munich, DE-81679
Germany
HOME PAGE: http://www.CESifo.de
IZA Institute of Labor Economics
P.O. Box 7240
Bonn, D-53072
Germany
Do you have a job opening that you would like to promote on SSRN?
Recommended Papers
-
Employer Learning, Statistical Discrimination and Occupational Attainment
-
By Henry S. Farber and Robert S. Gibbons
-
Comparative Advantage, Learning, and Sectoral Wage Determination
By Robert S. Gibbons, Lawrence F. Katz, ...
-
Testing Theories of Discrimination: Evidence from "Weakest Link"
-
Dispersion in the Economic Return to Schooling
By Colm P. Harmon, Vincent Hogan, ...
-
Does Education Raise Productivity or Just Reflect it?
By Arnaud Chevalier, Colm P. Harmon, ...