Interregional Bargaining and Minority Welfare in Public Good Provision under Representative Democracy

17 Pages Posted: 28 Oct 2016  

Ryusuke Shinohara

Department of Economics, Hosei University

Date Written: October 27, 2016

Abstract

We revisit Gradstein’s (2004) model of bargaining between two regions under representative democracy. Although our analysis is built on his model, we obtain results different from his. We show that if a minority region reaps sufficiently large benefits from a public good and its population is sufficiently large, then the bargaining benefits the entire economy. However, even if the bargaining benefits the entire economy, it may not be for the minority region. We show that the surplus of the minority region improves if and only if the minority region’s benefit from the public good and its population take large values.

Keywords: Public Goods, Strategic Delegation, Bargaining, Spillover

JEL Classification: D62, D72, H41, H77

Suggested Citation

Shinohara, Ryusuke, Interregional Bargaining and Minority Welfare in Public Good Provision under Representative Democracy (October 27, 2016). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2859907

Ryusuke Shinohara (Contact Author)

Department of Economics, Hosei University ( email )

4342
Aihara-machi
Machida, Tokyo 194-0298
Japan
+81-42-783-2534 (Phone)

HOME PAGE: http://ryusukeshinohara.ehoh.net/

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