The Coalition Structure Core is Accessible

7 Pages Posted: 4 Oct 2001

See all articles by Laszlo A. Koczy

Laszlo A. Koczy

Hungarian Academy of Sciences (HAS) - Research Centre for Economic and Regional Studies (HAS); Quantitative Social and Management Sciences Research Group, Budapest University of Technology and Economics

Luc Lauwers

KU Leuven

Date Written: October 2001

Abstract

For each outcome (i.e. a payoff vector augmented with a coalition structure) of a TU-game with a non-empty coalition structure core there exists a finite sequence of successively dominating outcomes that terminates in the coalition structure core. In order to obtain this result a restrictive dominance relation-which we call enforceable dominance-is employed.

Keywords: Coalition structure, core-extension, non-emptiness, dominance

JEL Classification: C71, C73

Suggested Citation

Koczy, Laszlo A. and Lauwers, Luc, The Coalition Structure Core is Accessible (October 2001). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=286034 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.286034

Laszlo A. Koczy (Contact Author)

Hungarian Academy of Sciences (HAS) - Research Centre for Economic and Regional Studies (HAS) ( email )

Budaörsi 45
Budapest, H-1112
Hungary

HOME PAGE: http://www.mtakti.hu/en/kutatok/laszlo-a-koczy/276/

Quantitative Social and Management Sciences Research Group, Budapest University of Technology and Economics ( email )

Magyar Tudósok krt. 2.
Budapest, 1117
Hungary

HOME PAGE: http://qsms.mokk.bme.hu/index.php/koczy/

Luc Lauwers

KU Leuven ( email )

Oude Markt 13
Leuven, Vlaams-Brabant
Belgium

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