Abstract

https://ssrn.com/abstract=286053
 
 

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The Ultimate Ownership of Western European Corporations


Mara Faccio


University of Chicago - Booth School of Business; Purdue University - Krannert School of Management; European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI); National University of Singapore (NUS) - Asian Bureau of Finance and Economic Research (ABFER)

Larry H.P. Lang


The Chinese University of Hong Kong (CUHK) - Department of Finance



Abstract:     
We analyze the ultimate ownership and control of 5,232 corporations in 13 Western European countries. Firms are typically widely held (36.93 percent) or family controlled (44.29 percent). Widely-held firms are more important in the U.K. and Ireland, family-controlled firms in continental Europe. Financial and large firms are more likely to be widely-held, while non-financial and small firms are more likely to be family-controlled. State control is important for larger firms in certain countries. Dual class shares and pyramids are used to enhance the control of the largest shareholders, but overall there are significant discrepancies between ownership and control in only a few countries.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 40

Keywords: Ownership, Corporate Governance

JEL Classification: G3


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Date posted: October 4, 2001  

Suggested Citation

Faccio, Mara and Lang, Larry H.P., The Ultimate Ownership of Western European Corporations. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=286053 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.286053

Contact Information

Mara Faccio (Contact Author)
University of Chicago - Booth School of Business ( email )
5807 S. Woodlawn Avenue
Chicago, IL 60637
United States
Purdue University - Krannert School of Management ( email )
1310 Krannert Building
West Lafayette, IN 47907-1310
United States
European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI)
c/o ECARES ULB CP 114
B-1050 Brussels
Belgium
HOME PAGE: http://www.ecgi.org
National University of Singapore (NUS) - Asian Bureau of Finance and Economic Research (ABFER) ( email )
BIZ 2 Storey 4, 04-05
1 Business Link
Singapore, 117592
Singapore
Hsien Ping Larry Lang
The Chinese University of Hong Kong (CUHK) - Department of Finance ( email )
Shatin, N.T.
Hong Kong
+85 2 2609 7761 (Phone)
+85 2 2603 6586 (Fax)
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