Cartel Dating

61 Pages Posted: 1 Nov 2016 Last revised: 3 Aug 2018

See all articles by H. Peter Boswijk

H. Peter Boswijk

Amsterdam School of Economics; Tinbergen Institute

Maurice J. G. Bun

University of Amsterdam (UVA) - Department of Quantitative Economics; Tinbergen Institute

Maarten Pieter Schinkel

University of Amsterdam - Department of Economics; Tinbergen Institute - Tinbergen Institute Amsterdam (TIA)

Multiple version iconThere are 2 versions of this paper

Date Written: July 17, 2018

Abstract

The begin and end dates of cartels are often ambiguous, despite competition authorities stating them with precision. The legally established infringement period(s) from documentary evidence need not coincide with the period(s) of actual cartel effects. In this paper, we show that misdating cartel effects leads to a (weak) overestimation of but-for prices and an underestimation of overcharges. Total overcharges based on comparing but-for prices to actual prices are a (weak) underestimation of the true amount overcharged, irrespective of the type and size of the misdating. The bias in antitrust damage estimation based on predicted cartel prices can have either sign. We extend the before-during-and-after method with an empirical cartel dating procedure, which infers structural breaks of unknown number and dates that mark the actual begin and end dates of the collusive effects. Empirical findings in the European Sodium Chlorate cartel corroborate our theoretical results.

Keywords: Cartel, antitrust damages, dates, structural change, break test, but-for

JEL Classification: C22, C51, L41

Suggested Citation

Boswijk, H. Peter and Bun, Maurice J. G. and Schinkel, Maarten Pieter, Cartel Dating (July 17, 2018). Amsterdam Law School Research Paper No. 2016-62; Forthcoming in the Journal of Applied Econometrics; Amsterdam Law School Research Paper No. 2016-62; Amsterdam Center for Law & Economics Working Paper No. 2016-05. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2860613 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2860613

H. Peter Boswijk (Contact Author)

Amsterdam School of Economics ( email )

Roetersstraat 11
Amsterdam, North Holland 1018 WB
Netherlands

HOME PAGE: http://www.uva.nl/profile/h.p.boswijk

Tinbergen Institute ( email )

Burg. Oudlaan 50
Rotterdam, 3062 PA
Netherlands

Maurice J. G. Bun

University of Amsterdam (UVA) - Department of Quantitative Economics ( email )

Roetersstraat 11
1018 WB Amsterdam
Netherlands
+31-20-5254257 (Phone)

Tinbergen Institute ( email )

Burg. Oudlaan 50
Rotterdam, 3062 PA
Netherlands

Maarten Pieter Schinkel

University of Amsterdam - Department of Economics ( email )

Roetersstraat 11
1018 WB Amsterdam
Netherlands
+31 20 525 7132 (Phone)
+31 20 525 5318 (Fax)

Tinbergen Institute - Tinbergen Institute Amsterdam (TIA) ( email )

Gustav Mahlerplein 117
Amsterdam, 1082 MS
Netherlands

Register to save articles to
your library

Register

Paper statistics

Downloads
297
Abstract Views
1,197
rank
85,804
PlumX Metrics