Budgeting and Public Debt within a System of Cooperative Democracy

40 Pages Posted: 31 Oct 2016

See all articles by Giuseppe Eusepi

Giuseppe Eusepi

Sapienza University of Rome

Richard E. Wagner

George Mason University - Department of Economics; George Mason University - Mercatus Center

Date Written: October 30, 2016

Abstract

This paper is the penultimate draft of the fourth of six chapters of a book titled Public Debt: An Illusion of Democratic Political Economy. This essay establishes an analytical benchmark of a democratic system in which political outcomes reflect genuine consensus among the participants. This benchmark traces to Antonio de Viti de Marco’s construction of contrasting models of democratic action. The theory of a wholly cooperative democratic regime provides a benchmark against which to examine actual democratic processes and arrangements. In this respect, and looking ahead, de Viti recognized that democratic regimes were not passive reflectors of individual preference orderings because they entailed relationships of domination-and-subordination.

Keywords: cooperative state as ideal type; government as low-cost borrower; public debt as shell game; problems of scale

JEL Classification: D72, E30, E62, H62

Suggested Citation

Eusepi, Giuseppe and Wagner, Richard E., Budgeting and Public Debt within a System of Cooperative Democracy (October 30, 2016). GMU Working Paper in Economics No. 16-45, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2861664 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2861664

Giuseppe Eusepi

Sapienza University of Rome ( email )

Via del Castro Laurenziano, 9
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+39 06 49766955 (Phone)

Richard E. Wagner (Contact Author)

George Mason University - Department of Economics ( email )

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HOME PAGE: http://mason.gmu.edu/~rwagner/

George Mason University - Mercatus Center ( email )

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Arlington, VA 22201
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HOME PAGE: http://ppe.mercatus.org/scholars/richard-wagner

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