'Monstrous Moral Hybrids' and the Corrupting Quality of Public Debt

38 Pages Posted: 31 Oct 2016

See all articles by Giuseppe Eusepi

Giuseppe Eusepi

Sapienza University of Rome

Richard E. Wagner

George Mason University - Department of Economics

Date Written: October 30, 2016

Abstract

This is the penultimate version of the last of six chapters in a book titled Public Debt: An Illusion of Democratic Political Economy. This essay explores how public debt is a troubling practice for republican and democratic regimes because of its ability to corrupt the language and practice of political economy. For instance, the idea of contract is a perfectly good and sensible concept to apply to the private ordering of economic interaction. When that term is extended to public ordering outside the hypothetical construction of a cooperative state, it becomes a piece of ideology that obscures the role of public debt in promoting the interests of politically dominant groups within society.

Keywords: Jane Jacobs; monstrous moral hybrids; romance vs. realism in public ordering; erosion of trust through public ordering

JEL Classification: D72, E30, E62, H62

Suggested Citation

Eusepi, Giuseppe and Wagner, Richard E., 'Monstrous Moral Hybrids' and the Corrupting Quality of Public Debt (October 30, 2016). GMU Working Paper in Economics No. 16-47. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2861666 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2861666

Giuseppe Eusepi

Sapienza University of Rome ( email )

Via del Castro Laurenziano, 9
Rome, RM 00161
Italy
+39 06 49766955 (Phone)

Richard E. Wagner (Contact Author)

George Mason University - Department of Economics ( email )

4400 University Drive
334 Enterprise Hall
Fairfax, VA 22030
United States
(703) 993-1132 (Phone)

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