Ownership and Productive Efficiency: Evidence from Estonia

35 Pages Posted: 5 Oct 2001

See all articles by Derek C. Jones

Derek C. Jones

Hamilton College - Economics Department

Niels Mygind

Copenhagen Business School - Center for East European Studies (CEES)

Multiple version iconThere are 2 versions of this paper

Date Written: August 2001

Abstract

Privatization in Estonia has produced varied ownership configurations. This enables hypotheses on the productivity effects of different ownership forms to be tested. Findings are based on fixed effects production function models and are estimated using a large, random sample of firms. Depending on the particular specification (and relative to state ownership) we find that: (i) private ownership is 13-22% more efficient; (ii) all types of private ownership are more productive, though managerial ownership has the biggest effects (21-32%) and ownership by domestic outsiders has the smallest impact (0-15%). The joint hypothesis that privatization coefficients are equal is rejected. Findings are robust with respect to choice of technology and the use of instrumental variable estimates. These results provide only partial support for the standard theory of privatization and stronger support for theorists who argue that some forms of insider ownership may constitute preferable forms of corporate governance in some circumstances.

JEL Classification: G34, O12, P2

Suggested Citation

Jones, Derek C. and Mygind, Niels, Ownership and Productive Efficiency: Evidence from Estonia (August 2001). William Davidson Institute Working Paper No. 385. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=286168 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.286168

Derek C. Jones (Contact Author)

Hamilton College - Economics Department ( email )

198 College Hill Road
Clinton, NY 13323
United States
315-859-4381 (Phone)
315-859-4477 (Fax)

Niels Mygind

Copenhagen Business School - Center for East European Studies (CEES) ( email )

Howitzvej 60
Frederiksberg, 2000
Denmark
(+45) 38 15 30 32 (Phone)
(+45) 38 15 30 37 (Fax)

Here is the Coronavirus
related research on SSRN

Paper statistics

Downloads
97
Abstract Views
940
rank
257,264
PlumX Metrics