Download This PaperDynamic Choice of Information Sources
California Institute of Technology Social Science Working Paper
ICEF Working Paper WP9/2019/05
59 Pages Posted: 3 Nov 2016 Last revised: 2 Oct 2020
Date Written: October 1, 2020
Abstract
An agent has to choose among a finite set of actions with payoffs depending on an unknown state of the world with two (possibly correlated) binary components, (θ1, θ2), θi∈{0,1}. Before making the choice, the agent can learn about the state by dynamically allocating his limited attention over two information sources, modelled as search processes for conclusive evidence of θ1=1 or θ2=1. In the special case where θ1+θ2 ≤1, the agent searches for the most probable evidence up to some time t*, and after that he continues by challenging his current beliefs in the most effective way. The agent never changes his allocation of attention after t*. When the state (1,1) is possible, the attention rule before t* is different. Sufficient conditions for t*>0 are given. A negative correlation between the state components increases t*.
Keywords: dynamic information acquisition, Poisson process, limited attention, correlation, media consumption
JEL Classification: D83
Suggested Citation: Suggested Citation
Tatiana Mayskaya (Contact Author)
National Research University Higher School of Economics - International College of Economics and Finance ( email )
Pokrovski Bulvar 11, Korpus Zh, Office 715
Moscow, 109028
Russia