Introduction to Economics of Corporate Law

Economics of Corporate Law (Edward Elgar, 2016)

Minnesota Legal Studies Research Paper No. 16-38

26 Pages Posted: 3 Nov 2016

See all articles by Claire A. Hill

Claire A. Hill

University of Minnesota Law School

Brett McDonnell

University of Minnesota Law School

Date Written: November 3, 2016

Abstract

The Economics of Corporate Law is a two-volume collection of the most influential articles in the development of the economic analysis of corporate law. This Introduction briefly describes each included article, summarizing each and placing it within its historic context. Each volume is divided into three parts. Part I of Volume I starts with three seminal contributions to the economics of the firm, by Ronald Coase, Michael Jensen and William Meckling, and Oliver Williamson. Part II collects articles on the board of directors and the purpose of the corporation. Part III includes leading contributions on the nature and role of state competition for corporate charters. Volume II begins with a section on hostile takeovers and defenses. Part II of Volume II includes articles on shareholder suits and other mechanisms aimed at limiting agency problems. Part III of Volume III concludes with three articles that take broad, theoretical perspectives on corporate law and corporate governance.

Keywords: Corporate law, law and economics, corporate governance

JEL Classification: D21, G30, K22, L21

Suggested Citation

Hill, Claire Ariane and McDonnell, Brett H., Introduction to Economics of Corporate Law (November 3, 2016). Economics of Corporate Law (Edward Elgar, 2016); Minnesota Legal Studies Research Paper No. 16-38. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2863922

Claire Ariane Hill

University of Minnesota Law School ( email )

229 19th Avenue South
Minneapolis, MN 55455
United States
612-624-6521 (Phone)

Brett H. McDonnell (Contact Author)

University of Minnesota Law School ( email )

229 19th Avenue South
Minneapolis, MN 55455
United States
612-625-1373 (Phone)

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