From the early decades of the twentieth century, a dominant characteristic of the modern “capitalist” corporation, especially in the United States, was the separation of asset ownership in the form of publicly traded shares from allocative control over the corporation’s resources by salaried managers. By the 1950s some depicted managerial-controlled large enterprise as the “soulful” corporation in which the allocation of resources resulted in enhanced social welfare. In the 1960s, however, some conservative academics looked to market forces, dubbed the ‘market for corporate control’, to ensure that managers as employees would give primacy to shareholders in the allocation of corporate resources. This market for corporate control could enable hostile takeovers in which shareholders who accumulated large public equity stakes in a company could discipline managers to allocate resources in ways that “the market” deemed to be efficient. The notion that market allocation could control managerial organization was then developed theoretically based on the conceptualisation that the corporation (and indeed any firm) could be conceptualised as a ‘nexus of contracts’ or a ‘collection of assets’. Rather than view the corporation as a social organization with its unique history and competitive capabilities in which public shareholders had come to play a peripheral role, neoclassical economists conceptualised the corporation as a set of voluntary contracts among owners of resources and as a portfolio of assets with different market-determined rates of returns.
This conceptualisation of the corporation to fit with the dominant neoclassical theory of the market economy had implications. We provide this Summary of certain fundamentals of economics in an effort to help prevent analytical errors which can have severe and damaging effects on corporations.
Lazonick, William and Blankenburg, Stephanie and Froud, Julie and O’Sullivan, Mary A. and Sauviat, Catherine and Reberioux, Antoine and Chang, Ha-Joon and Mazzucato, Mariana and Thompson, Grahame F. and Keen, Steve and Quattrone, Paolo and May, Christopher and Lancastle, Neil and Czarniawska, Barbara and Knights, David and Horn, Laura and Talmud, Ilan and Komlik, Oleg and Schwardt, Henning and Robson, Keith and Hines, Tony and Wright, Robert Eric and Houston, Muir and Ali Dikerdem, Mehmet and Boland, Maureen and Djelic, Marie-Laure and O'Rourke, Brendan K and Kaul, Nitasha and Holmwood, John and Kuhn, Timothy and Ainley, Patrick and Sherpa, Dawa and Welch, Philip and Reader, Keith and Culik, Jan and McSorley, Kevin and Edmond, Nadia and Fleetwood, Steve and M. Fischer, Andrew and Delalieux, Guillaume and Syna Desivilya, Helena and Leech, Dennis and Loughlin, Michael and Maley, Willy and Wield, David and Nissanke, Machiko and Brown, Roger and Addis, Mark and Farquhar, Stuart Sean and Cooper, David J. and Carter, Chris and Sabaratnam, Meera and Aluchna, Maria and Gill, Roger and Bryer, Alice and Beusch, Peter and Harfoush, Nabil and Vrolijk, Hein and Cooke, Bill and Pirson, Michael and Jacobs, David Carroll and Contu, Alessia and Chabrak, Nihel and Ireland, Philip and Matthaei, Julie and Bavoso, Vincenzo and Ali, Tanweer and Massa, Lorenzo and Massa, Lorenzo and Gindis, David and Smith, Michael and Chanteau, Jean-Pierre and F Coles, Robert and Palazzi, Marcello and Martin, Roger L. and Willmott, Hugh Christopher and Willmott, Hugh Christopher and Veldman, Jeroen, The Modern Corporation Statement on Economics (November 4, 2016). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2864246 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2864246
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