Cultural Differences in Ultimatum Game Experiments: Evidence from a Meta-Analysis

24 Pages Posted: 10 Oct 2001

See all articles by Hessel Oosterbeek

Hessel Oosterbeek

University of Amsterdam - Research Institute in Economics & Econometrics (RESAM); Tinbergen Institute Amsterdam (TIA); Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA)

Randolph Sloof

University of Amsterdam - Faculty of Economics & Business (FEB); Tinbergen Institute

Gijs van de Kuilen

Tilburg University

Date Written: October 2001

Abstract

This paper reports the results of a meta-analysis of 32 papers with results from ultimatum game experiments. We find that on average the proposer offers 40% of the pie to the responder. This share is independent of the size of the pie and of the use of the strategy method. On average 16% of the offers is rejected. This rejection rate is lower for larger pie sizes and tends to decrease with the share offered. Responders are less willing to accept low offers when the strategy method is employed. As the studies come from different countries, meta-analysis provides an alternative way to investigate whether bargaining behavior in ultimatum games differs across countries. We find differences in proposer and in responder behavior across (groups of) countries. These differences tend to follow geographical lines rather than the cultural classifications provided by Hofstede (1991), and by Huntington (1996) and Inglehart (2000) respectively.

Keywords: ultimatum game, meta-analysis, cultural differences

JEL Classification: C78, C91, Z10

Suggested Citation

Oosterbeek, Hessel and Sloof, Randolph and van de Kuilen, Gijs, Cultural Differences in Ultimatum Game Experiments: Evidence from a Meta-Analysis (October 2001). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=286428 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.286428

Hessel Oosterbeek (Contact Author)

University of Amsterdam - Research Institute in Economics & Econometrics (RESAM) ( email )

Roetersstraat 11
Amsterdam
Netherlands
+31 20 525 4242 (Phone)
+31 20 525 5283 (Fax)

HOME PAGE: http://www.fee.uva.nl/scholar/oosterbeek/

Tinbergen Institute Amsterdam (TIA)

Burg. Oudlaan 50
Rotterdam, 3062 PA
Netherlands

Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA)

P.O. Box 7240
Bonn, D-53072
Germany

Randolph Sloof

University of Amsterdam - Faculty of Economics & Business (FEB) ( email )

Roetersstraat 11
Amsterdam, 1018 WB
Netherlands
+31 20 525 5241 (Phone)
+31 20 525 4310 (Fax)

Tinbergen Institute ( email )

Gustav Mahlerplein 117
Amsterdam, 1082 MS
Netherlands

Gijs Van de Kuilen

Tilburg University ( email )

P.O. Box 90153
Tilburg, DC Noord-Brabant 5000 LE
Netherlands

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