The Modern Corporation Statement on Politics

4 Pages Posted: 5 Nov 2016

See all articles by Glenn Morgan

Glenn Morgan

University of Bristol

Susanne Soederberg

Queen’s University

Dieter Plehwe

Social Science Research Centre Berlin

Laura Horn

Roskilde University

Bob Jessop

Lancaster University

Andreas Nölke

University of Frankfurt

Hugo Keeling Radice

University of Leeds

E. Bastiaan van Apeldoorn

VU University Amsterdam

Sigurt Vitols

WZB Berlin Social Science Center

John W. Cioffi

University of California, Political Science

Gerald F. Davis

University of Michigan, Stephen M. Ross School of Business

Timothy Kuhn

University of Colorado at Boulder

Jean-Pierre Chanteau

Université Grenoble Alpes

Dermot O'Reilly

Lancaster University

Pik Liew

University of Essex - Essex Business School

Nihel Chabrak

College of Business, United Arab Emirates University

Muir Houston

University of Glasgow

Nitasha Kaul

University of the West of England

Tanweer Ali

State University of New York (SUNY), Empire State College

Bronwen Morgan

University of New South Wales (UNSW) - Faculty of Law

Lorna Stevenson

University of St. Andrews

Hugh Christopher Willmott

City University London - Sir John Cass Business School; Cardiff Business School

Jeroen Veldman

City University London - Faculty of Management

Date Written: November 4, 2016

Abstract

Corporate governance is political. Corporate governance is about who gets to have a say in how businesses are organized and how their fruits are divided among different constituencies, particularly owners and workers. National and international politics, laws and regulations shape both the issue of decision-making and the issue of division.

In this framing, questions about the “purpose of the corporation” are distinctly political, because the organization of corporate governance is a consequence of political decisions; a stake of political struggles, creating some of the basic ground rules over how the proceeds from business are distributed; and a source of political interests and conflicts because actors’ position in the system of business and finance shape who benefits and who has a voice in economic choices.

We provide this Summary of certain fundamentals of politics in an effort to help prevent analytical errors which can have severe and damaging effects on corporations.

Keywords: Corporate, Governance, Company, Law, Management, Shareholder, Value, Stakeholder, Economics, Politics, Sustainable, Growth

JEL Classification: A1, E6, E60, G3, G30, H1, H10, H3, H30

Suggested Citation

Morgan, Glenn and Soederberg, Susanne and Plehwe, Dieter and Horn, Laura and Jessop, Bob and Nölke, Andreas and Radice, Hugo Keeling and van Apeldoorn, E. Bastiaan and Vitols, Sigurt and Cioffi, John W. and Davis, Gerald F. and Kuhn, Timothy and Chanteau, Jean-Pierre and O'Reilly, Dermot and Liew, Pik and Chabrak, Nihel and Houston, Muir and Kaul, Nitasha and Ali, Tanweer and Morgan, Bronwen and Stevenson, Lorna and Willmott, Hugh Christopher and Veldman, Jeroen, The Modern Corporation Statement on Politics (November 4, 2016). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2864474 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2864474

Glenn Morgan

University of Bristol ( email )

United Kingdom

Susanne Soederberg

Queen’s University ( email )

Kingston, Ontario K7L 3N6
Canada

Dieter Plehwe

Social Science Research Centre Berlin ( email )

Berlin, 10785
Germany

Laura Horn

Roskilde University ( email )

Universitetsvej 1
P.O. Box 260
Roskilde, DK-4000
Denmark

Bob Jessop

Lancaster University

Lancaster LA1 4YX
United Kingdom

Andreas Nölke

University of Frankfurt

Grüneburgplatz 1
Frankfurt am Main, 60323
Germany

Hugo Keeling Radice

University of Leeds ( email )

Leeds, LS2 9JT
United Kingdom

E. Bastiaan Van Apeldoorn

VU University Amsterdam ( email )

De Boelelaan 1105
Amsterdam, ND North Holland 1081 HV
Netherlands

Sigurt Vitols

WZB Berlin Social Science Center ( email )

Reichpietschufer 50
D-10785 Berlin
Germany

John W. Cioffi

University of California, Political Science ( email )

Riverside, CA 92521
United States
951-787-7269 (Phone)

Gerald F. Davis

University of Michigan, Stephen M. Ross School of Business ( email )

701 Tappan Street
Ann Arbor, MI 48109-1234
United States
734-647-4737 (Phone)
734-936-0282 (Fax)

Timothy Kuhn

University of Colorado at Boulder ( email )

1070 Edinboro Drive
Boulder, CO 80309
United States

Jean-Pierre Chanteau

Université Grenoble Alpes ( email )

France

Dermot O'Reilly

Lancaster University ( email )

Lancaster LA1 4YX
United Kingdom

Pik Liew

University of Essex - Essex Business School ( email )

Wivenhoe Park
Colchester CO4 3SQ
United Kingdom
+44 0 1206 873844 (Phone)
+44 0 1206 873429 (Fax)

Nihel Chabrak

College of Business, United Arab Emirates University ( email )

P.O. Box 15551
Al-Ain
United Arab Emirates

Muir Houston

University of Glasgow ( email )

Adam Smith Business School
Glasgow, Scotland G12 8LE
United Kingdom

Nitasha Kaul

University of the West of England

Blackberry Hill Bristol
Bristol, Avon BS16 1QY
United Kingdom

Tanweer Ali

State University of New York (SUNY), Empire State College ( email )

2 Union Ave
Saratoga Springs, NY 12866
United States

Bronwen Morgan

University of New South Wales (UNSW) - Faculty of Law ( email )

Kensington, New South Wales 2052
Australia

Lorna Stevenson

University of St. Andrews ( email )

North St
Fife KY16 9AJ

Hugh Christopher Willmott

City University London - Sir John Cass Business School ( email )

106 Bunhill Row
London, EC1Y 8TZ
United Kingdom

Cardiff Business School ( email )

Cardiff CF10 3EU
United Kingdom

HOME PAGE: http://https://sites.google.com/site/hughwillmottshomepage

Jeroen Veldman (Contact Author)

City University London - Faculty of Management ( email )

London
United Kingdom

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