Abstract

https://ssrn.com/abstract=2864846
 


 



Counterparty Risk and Counterparty Choice in the Credit Default Swap Market


Wenxin Du


Federal Reserve Board

Salil Gadgil


Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System

Michael B. Gordy


Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve

Clara Vega


Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System

2016-09-08

FEDS Working Paper No. 2016-087

Abstract:     
We investigate how market participants price and manage counterparty risk in the post-crisis period using confidential trade repository data on single-name credit default swap (CDS) transactions. We find that counterparty risk has a modest impact on the pricing of CDS contracts, but a large impact on the choice of counterparties. We show that market participants are significantly less likely to trade with counterparties whose credit risk is highly correlated with the credit risk of the reference entities and with counterparties whose credit quality is relatively low. Furthermore, we examine the impact of central clearing on CDS pricing. Contrary to the previous literature, but consistent with our main findings on pricing, we find no evidence that central clearing increases transaction spreads.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 42

Keywords: Counterparty credit risk, Credit default swaps, Central clearing

JEL Classification: G12, G13, G24


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Date posted: November 7, 2016  

Suggested Citation

Du, Wenxin and Gadgil, Salil and Gordy, Michael B. and Vega, Clara, Counterparty Risk and Counterparty Choice in the Credit Default Swap Market (2016-09-08). FEDS Working Paper No. 2016-087. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2864846 or http://dx.doi.org/10.17016/FEDS.2016.087

Contact Information

Wenxin Du (Contact Author)
Federal Reserve Board ( email )
20th Street and Constitution Avenue NW
Washington, DC 20551
United States

Salil Gadgil
Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System ( email )
20th Street and Constitution Avenue NW
Washington, DC 20551
United States

Michael B. Gordy
Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve ( email )
20th & C. St., N.W.
Washington, DC 20551
United States
202-452-3705 (Phone)
Clara Vega
Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System ( email )
20th Street and Constitution Avenue NW
Washington, DC 20551
United States
HOME PAGE: http://www.federalreserve.gov/research/staff/vegaclarax.htm

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