On Some Collusive and Signaling Equilibria in Ascending Auctions for Multiple Objects

21 Pages Posted: 11 Oct 2001

See all articles by Gian-Luigi Albano

Gian-Luigi Albano

University College London, Italian Procurement Agency (Consip S.p.A.)

Fabrizio Germano

Universitat Pompeu Fabra - Department of Economics and Business

Stefano Lovo

HEC Paris - Finance Department

Date Written: May 2003

Abstract

We consider two ascending auctions and show that many of the (unwanted) collusive or signaling equilibria studied in the literature in the framework of the SEAMO (simultaneous English auction for multiple objects) don't have a counterpart in the JAMO (Japanese auction for multiple objects). We show however that certain retaliatory equilibria do exist in both auctions.

Keywords: Multi-unit auctions, ascending auctions, FCC auctions, collusion, retaliation

JEL Classification: C72, D44

Suggested Citation

Albano, Gian-Luigi and Germano, Fabrizio and Lovo, Stefano, On Some Collusive and Signaling Equilibria in Ascending Auctions for Multiple Objects (May 2003). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=286559 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.286559

Gian-Luigi Albano (Contact Author)

University College London, Italian Procurement Agency (Consip S.p.A.) ( email )

Gower Street
London
United Kingdom
+39 06 8544 9627 (Phone)

Fabrizio Germano

Universitat Pompeu Fabra - Department of Economics and Business ( email )

Ramon Trias Fargas 25-27
Barcelona, 08005
Spain
+34-93-542-2729 (Phone)
+34-93-542-1746 (Fax)

Stefano Lovo

HEC Paris - Finance Department ( email )

1 rue de la Liberation
Jouy-en-Josas Cedex, 78351
France

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