Download This PaperOn Some Collusive and Signaling Equilibria in Ascending Auctions for Multiple Objects
21 Pages Posted: 11 Oct 2001
Date Written: May 2003
Abstract
We consider two ascending auctions and show that many of the (unwanted) collusive or signaling equilibria studied in the literature in the framework of the SEAMO (simultaneous English auction for multiple objects) don't have a counterpart in the JAMO (Japanese auction for multiple objects). We show however that certain retaliatory equilibria do exist in both auctions.
Keywords: Multi-unit auctions, ascending auctions, FCC auctions, collusion, retaliation
JEL Classification: C72, D44
Suggested Citation: Suggested Citation
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