Abstract

https://ssrn.com/abstract=2866378
 


 



Efficiency-Morality Trade-Offs in Repugnant Transactions: A Choice Experiment


Julio Elias


University of CEMA

Nicola Lacetera


University of Toronto - Strategic Management; University of Toronto at Mississauga - Department of Management; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

Mario Macis


Johns Hopkins University; IZA Institute of Labor Economics; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

September 27, 2016

CESifo Working Paper Series No. 6085

Abstract:     
Societies prohibit many transactions considered morally repugnant, although potentially efficiency-enhancing. We conducted an online choice experiment to characterize preferences for the morality and efficiency of payments to kidney donors. Preferences were heterogeneous, ranging from deontological to strongly consequentialist; the median respondent would support payments by a public agency if they increased the annual kidney supply by six percentage points, and private transactions for a thirty percentage-point increase. Fairness concerns drive this difference. Our findings suggest that cost-benefit considerations affect the acceptance of morally controversial transactions, and imply that trial studies of the effects of payments would inform the public debate.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 91

Keywords: repugnant transactions, efficiency, morality, markets, preferences

JEL Classification: C910, D010, D630, D640, I110


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Date posted: November 9, 2016  

Suggested Citation

Elias, Julio and Lacetera, Nicola and Macis, Mario, Efficiency-Morality Trade-Offs in Repugnant Transactions: A Choice Experiment (September 27, 2016). CESifo Working Paper Series No. 6085. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2866378

Contact Information

Julio Elias
University of CEMA ( email )
1054 Buenos Aires
Argentina
Nicola Lacetera (Contact Author)
University of Toronto - Strategic Management ( email )
Canada

University of Toronto at Mississauga - Department of Management
Canada
National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) ( email )
1050 Massachusetts Avenue
Cambridge, MA 02138
United States
Mario Macis
Johns Hopkins University ( email )
100 International Drive
Baltimore, MD 21202
United States
IZA Institute of Labor Economics ( email )
P.O. Box 7240
Bonn, D-53072
Germany

National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) ( email )
1050 Massachusetts Avenue
Cambridge, MA 02138
United States
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