Accidental Rivals? EU Fiscal Rules, NATO, and Transatlantic Burden-Sharing

45 Pages Posted: 10 Nov 2016 Last revised: 5 Oct 2017

See all articles by Jordan Becker

Jordan Becker

King's College London; United States Military Academy, Department of Social Science; Vesalius College; Free University of Brussels (VUB)-Vrije Universiteit Brussel, Institute for European Studies, Students

Date Written: November 9, 2016

Abstract

Both theorists and practitioners continue to show interest in transatlantic burden-sharing. International security and political economy scholarship offers plausible explanations for transatlantic imbalances in military expenditures. However, NATO Allies and EU Member States have pledged to one another to allocate resources in particular ways within defense budgets, a behavior that extant scholarship, even in the field of interorganizational relations, does not fully address. I argue that stringent fiscal rules dampen the kind of defense spending NATO and EU strategists seek: governments respond to increasing stringency by reducing overall defense expenditures, while at the same time shifting existing defense resources to personnel, and away from equipment or other expenditures. I find evidence in support of this argument by using education levels and age dependency ratios in the states in question as instruments for fiscal rules. This phenomenon represents a significant risk for important transatlantic strategic initiatives, namely NATO’s Wales pledge on defense investment.

Keywords: NATO, EU, Transatlantic Security, Defense Economics, Fiscal Rules, Fiscal Sanctions, Excessive Deficit Procedure

JEL Classification: C01, C12, C13, C33, C36, F50, F52, F53, F55, H56, H62, H87

Suggested Citation

Becker, Jordan, Accidental Rivals? EU Fiscal Rules, NATO, and Transatlantic Burden-Sharing (November 9, 2016). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2866858 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2866858

Jordan Becker (Contact Author)

King's College London ( email )

King's College London Strand
London, WC2R 2LS
United Kingdom

United States Military Academy, Department of Social Science ( email )

600 Thayer Rd
West Point, NY 10996
United States

Vesalius College ( email )

Pleinlaan 2
Brussels, B-1050
Belgium

Free University of Brussels (VUB)-Vrije Universiteit Brussel, Institute for European Studies, Students ( email )

Ixelles
Belgium

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