Nation Building: The Role of Central Spending in Education

45 Pages Posted: 9 Nov 2016

See all articles by Francesco Cinnirella

Francesco Cinnirella

University of Bergamo; University of Southern Denmark - Department of Business and Economics; CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute) - Ifo Institute; Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR); CAGE

Ruth Schueler

CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute) - Ifo Institute

Multiple version iconThere are 2 versions of this paper

Date Written: September 2016

Abstract

It is generally argued that, in the context of Imperial Germany, public primary education was used to form “loyal citizens” and to build a nation. In this paper we analyze to what extent central spending on primary education affected participation at general elections and votes for pro-nationalist parties. We combine census data on the sources of school funding with federal election data at the level of 199 constituencies in five-year intervals from 1886 to 1911. Panel estimates of models with constituency and time-fixed effects show that an increase in the share of central spending is positively related to the vote share of pro-nationalist parties and voter turnout. Results from models with lagged central spending by category of expenditure are consistent with the role of indoctrination of public primary education.

Keywords: nation building, primary education, indoctrination, Prussian economic history

JEL Classification: N330, N430, H720, I280

Suggested Citation

Cinnirella, Francesco and Schueler, Ruth, Nation Building: The Role of Central Spending in Education (September 2016). CESifo Working Paper Series No. 6103, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2866918 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2866918

Francesco Cinnirella (Contact Author)

University of Bergamo ( email )

Via dei Caniana 2
Bergamo, 24129
Italy

University of Southern Denmark - Department of Business and Economics ( email )

DK-5230 Odense
Denmark

CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute) - Ifo Institute ( email )

Poschingerstrasse 5
Munich, 81679
Germany

Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR) ( email )

London
United Kingdom

CAGE ( email )

Premier Business Centre
47-49 Park Royal Road
London, NW10 7LQ
United Kingdom

Ruth Schueler

CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute) - Ifo Institute ( email )

Poschinger Str. 5
Munich, 01069
Germany

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