Authority and Communication in Firms

53 Pages Posted: 10 Nov 2016 Last revised: 6 Aug 2018

See all articles by Hajime Katayama

Hajime Katayama

Waseda University - School of Commerce

Kieron Meagher

Australian National University (ANU) - School of Economics

Andrew Wait

University of Sydney

Date Written: August 2, 2018

Abstract

We show that decision making in organizations is typically more complicated than simply choosing either to delegate or to centralize. Firms have to consider not only the level at which a decision is made (authority location) but also how many people are involved (authority diffusion), and the type of communication. Utilizing a unique data set, we estimate a latent-class model to identify frequently adopted combinations of decision-making rights and communication across different hierarchical levels relating to the implementation of a significant change. We identify four typical authority/communication structures that can be loosely categorized as: authoritarian centralization; team decision making; consultative centralization; and decentralization. We then explore the relationships between these four authority/communication structures and other characteristics of the firm, such as the size of the organization, worker skills, long-term employer-employee relationships, individual and group incentives and how close the firm is to the productivity frontier. These results are broadly consistent with recent advances in theory, although no one model is rich enough to fully describe all our findings.

Keywords: Centralization, Delegation, Communication, Consultation, Relational Contracting, Organisational Structure, Latent-Class Model

JEL Classification: D23, L22, L23, L29

Suggested Citation

Katayama, Hajime and Meagher, Kieron and Wait, Andrew, Authority and Communication in Firms (August 2, 2018). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2867235 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2867235

Hajime Katayama

Waseda University - School of Commerce ( email )

School of Commerce, Waseda University
1-6-1 Nishi-Waseda Shinjyuku-ku
Tokyo, Tokyo 169 - 8050
Japan

Kieron Meagher (Contact Author)

Australian National University (ANU) - School of Economics ( email )

Coombs Building 9
Canberra, Australian Capital Territory 0200
Australia

Andrew Wait

University of Sydney ( email )

School of Economics
University of Sydney, NSW 2006
Australia
+61-2-9351-3060 (Phone)
+61-2-9351-4341 (Fax)

HOME PAGE: http://sydney.edu.au/arts/economics/

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