Enforcement of UN Security Council Resolutions and of International Court of Justice Judgments: The Unreliability of Political Enforcement Mechanisms

Andras Jakab and Dimitry Kochenov (eds), The Enforcement of EU Law and Values: Ensuring Member States’ Compliance, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2017

24 Pages Posted: 12 Nov 2016 Last revised: 28 Jan 2017

Date Written: October 10, 2016

Abstract

This study outlines the different enforcement mechanisms of Security Council resolutions as well as of ICJ judgments. Overall, enforcement can take two forms: direct enforcement, when the content of the decision not implemented by the addressee is implemented by another actor; or indirect enforcement, when coercive measures are taken against the non-complying actor in order to compel compliance. The study first outlines how binding Security Council measures are enforced, before analysing the enforcement of ICJ judgments. It then examines the enforcement of Security Council resolutions and of ICJ judgments, arguing that such enforcement is mostly political, influenced by State sensitivities and thus, unreliable. The study finally concludes with some proposed alternatives to improving the consistency of the enforcement of Security Council and ICJ measures.

Keywords: ICJ, ICJ judgments, Security Council, Security Council resolutions, direct enforcement, indirect enforcement

Suggested Citation

Couzigou, Irene, Enforcement of UN Security Council Resolutions and of International Court of Justice Judgments: The Unreliability of Political Enforcement Mechanisms (October 10, 2016). Andras Jakab and Dimitry Kochenov (eds), The Enforcement of EU Law and Values: Ensuring Member States’ Compliance, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2017, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2868135 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2868135

Irene Couzigou (Contact Author)

University of Aberdeen ( email )

Dunbar Street
Aberdeen, Scotland AB24 3QY
United Kingdom

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