It's a Sweetheart of a Deal: Political Connections and Corporate-Federal Contracting

We examine whether political connections measured by political contributions influence the choice of terms included in government contracts awarded to firms. We construct an index of four “sweetheart” contract terms and find that firms making larger political contributions more frequently have these favorable terms included in their contracts. We also find that political contributions have explanatory power for contract design after controlling for lobbying, negotiation power, and the employment of former government employees. These results are robust to alternative model specifications, different estimation techniques, various variable measurements, and adjustments for possible endogeneity.

Keywords: Contracting, political connections

JEL Classification: G32; GT34; G38

Suggested Citation: Suggested Citation

Ferris, Stephen P. and Houston, Reza and Javakhadze, David, It's a Sweetheart of a Deal: Political Connections and Corporate-Federal Contracting (August 13, 2018). Financial Review, Vol. 54, Issue 1, pp. 57-84, 2019 , Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2869878 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2869878